

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-13 ADP-00 ACDA-19 AF-10 ARA-11

CIAE-00 EA-11 PM-07 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NASA-04 NEA-10

NSAE-00 NSC-10 OIC-04 PA-03 PRS-01 RSC-01 SCI-06

SS-15 MBFR-03 USIA-12 SAJ-01 RSR-01 /183 W

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R 281804 Z JUN 73

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0101

INFO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

SECDEF WASHDC

USMISSION NATO

USAEC GERMANTOWN

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DOD FOR ARPO

EO 11652: N/ A

TAGS: PARM, NL

SUBJ: CCD: EXERPTS FROM STATEMENT BY DUTCH FN AFFAIRS SECY ON CTB

1. FOLLOWING IS PORTION ON COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB)
EXCERPTED FROM STATEMENT MADE TO CCD TODAY BY DR P
H KOOIJMANS, STATE SECY FOR FN AFFAIRS, THE NETHERLANDS.

2. BEGIN TEXT: A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. I TRUST TO GIVE EXPRESSION
TO A WIDELY SHARED OPINION BY CALLING THE NEGOTIATIONS
ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN ONE OF THE MOST LONG DRAWN- OUT
AND DISAPPOINTING EFFORTS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT.
BUT BEFORE I MAKE SOME CRITICAL REMARKS I SHOULD LIKE TO
PLACE THEM IN THE RIGHT CONTEXT IN ORDER THAT I SHALL NOT
BE MISUNDERSTOOD. I AM AWARE THAT, IN VIEW OF THE VITAL
SECURITY ISSUES AT STAKE, THE MAIN NUCLEAR POWERS WILL,
OF COURSE, NOT BE INCLINED TO TAKE STEPS LIGHTEARTEDLY
AND, AS ANY MOUNTAINEER KNOWS, CLIMBING DOWN IS MORE
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DANGEROUS AND MORE TIRING THAN SCALING A MOUNTAIN. IF I MAKE A CRITICISM, IT IS ONLY IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT OF TRYING TO NARROW DOWN THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS.

3. NOW LET ME BE MORE SPECIFIC. ON THE SIXTH OF MARCH 1973 THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION IN THIS COMMITTEE ASKED THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION IF THE CONCLUSION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN WOULD, ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET VIEW, ONLY BE FEASIBLE IF ALL NUCLEAR- WEAPON POWERS WOULD PARTICIPATE. THE REPLY OF MR ROSHCIN WAS NOT VERY CLEAR. ON THE 29 TH OF MARCH HE SAID THAT " NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS, INCLUDING UNDERGROUND TESTS, BY EVERYONE EVERYWHERE, CAN CONTINUE IN THIS COMMITTEE AS BEFORE, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT CHINA AND FRANCE ARE NOT PARTICIPATING IN ITS WORK. NATURALLY, AN AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS BY EVERYONE EVERYWHERE CAN ONLY BE EFFECTIVE IF ALL NUCLEAR STATES BECOME PARTIES TO IT."

4. WHAT DO THESE WORDS MEAN? OF COURSE " CESSATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS BY EVERYONE EVERYWHERE" LOGICALLY DEMANDS THE COOPERATION OF ALL NUCLEAR- WEAPON POWERS AND EVEN OF EVERY SINGLE STATE IN THE WORLD. WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW, HOWEVER, IS WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE PREPARED TO BE A PARTY TO AN UNDERGROUND TEST BAN, COMPLEMENTARY TO THE MOSCOW TREATY OF 1963, EVEN IF NOT ALL SMALLER NUCLEAR POWERS ADHERE TO BOTH TREATIES? IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR TO US WHAT THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WOULD BE.

5. IF THE SOVIET UNION REALLY MEANS THAT ALL NUCLEAR POWERS MUST ADHERE TO A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, IT CAN HARDLY BE DENIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FAILURE OF ACHIEVING SUCH A TREATY. FOR THE SECOND TIME DURING THE EXTREMELY LONG NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TEST BAN ISSUE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE HARDENED ITS POSITION INSTEAD OF MAKING CONCESSIONS. IN 1964 THE SOVIET UNION WITHDREW ITS OFFER FOR TWO TO THREE ON- SITE INSPECTIONS ON ITS TERRITORY. IT NOW SEEMS TO ASK THE ADHERENCE OF ALL NUCLEAR- WEAPON POWERS TO A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT WE ARE MISTAKEN.

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6. THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SEISMOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS. HUGE ARRAYS HAVE BEEN BUILT AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT LIKE LONG- PERIOD INSTRUMENTS HAS BEEN DEVELOPED. IT IS A FAIR SUPPOSITION WHAT WITHOUT THE GREAT EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES THE PRESENT IDENTIFICATION CAPABILITIES WOULD NOT EXIST. OF

COURSE, OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE MADE VERY SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE FIELD OF SEISMOLOGY, NOTABLY THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA, SWEDEN AND JAPAN. THE UNITED STATES HAS ALSO BEEN VERY GENEROUS IN GIVING INFORMATION ON TECHNICAL ISSUES.

7. IN THIS RESPECT I NOTE WITH REGRET THAT THE SOVIET UNION NEVER MADE ANY CONTRIBUTION IN THIS COMMITTEE TO THE SOLUTION OF SEISMOLOGICAL AND OTHER IDENTIFICATION PROBLEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN UNDERGROUND TEST BAN. IT WAS INTERESTING TO READ REPORTS THAT AMERICAN SEISMOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT WILL BE PLACED IN THE PAMIR MOUNTAINS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION AND SOVIET EQUIPMENT IN CALIFORNIA UNDER AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO STUDY EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION METHODS. ONE WONDERS WHY SUCH INTENSIVE SEISMOLOGICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS CANNOT BE EXTENDED TO THE FIELDS OF ARMS CONTROL.

8. ESPECIALLY THE LAST, SAY, FIVE YEARS IT HAS BECOME CLEAR TO PRACTICALLY ALL OF US HERE THAT FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS IN SEISMOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES WERE MADE. UNLIKE IN THE EARLY SIXTIES, POSITIVE TECHNIQUES ARE NOW AVAILABLE FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. HOWEVER, THESE FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS HAVE NOT, AS YET, BROUGHT ABOUT A MODIFICATION OF THE ATTITUDE OF THOSE WHO INSIST ON OBLIGATORY ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AS INDISPENSABLE FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION. BASSIN

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OIC-04 PA-03 PRS-01 RSC-01 SCI-06 SS-15 MBFR-03

USIA-12 SAJ-01 RSR-01 /183 W

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R 281804 Z JUN 73

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0102
INFO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS
USAEC GERMANTOWN

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DOD FOR ARPO

9. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS TAKES THE VIEW THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF ON- SITE INSPECTIONS WOULD NOT CHANGE IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY THE NUMBER OF EVENTS WHICH CAN BE IDENTIFIED. A MORE TECHNICAL ANALYSIS UNDERLYING THIS CONCLUSION WILL BE PRESENTED BY THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION IN THE FORTHCOMING INFORMAL MEETING WITH EXPERTS. TWO YEARS AGO THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION ALREADY STATED THAT THE ONLY CATEGORY OF EVENTS TO WHICH ON- SITE INSPECTIONS ARE RELEVANT, COMPRISES THOSE WHICH CAN BE DETECTED AND LOCATED BUT NOT IDENTIFIED. THERE IS NO NEED OF ON- SITE INSPECTIONS IN THE CASE OF EVENT WHICH CAN BE IDENTIFIED BY SEISMOLOGICAL AND OTHER MEANS WHILE ON THE OTHER HAND, EVENTS WHICH CANNOT BE LOCATED OR NOT EVEN DETECTED BY THESE NATIONAL MEANS COULDN' T POSSIBLY BE TRACED BY SUCH INSPECTIONS. WE ALSO STATED AT THE TIME THAT THIS RELEVANT GROUP OF EVENTS THAT COULD BE LOCATED BUT NOT IDENTIFIED IS BECOMING SMALLER AND SMALLER AS A RESULT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SEISMOLOGY. WE ARE NOW OF THE OPINION THAT, ESPECIALLY BY VIRTUE OF
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PRESENT LONG- PERIOD SEISMIC CAPABILITIES, THIS GROUP OF EVENTS HAS PRACTICALLY VANISHED.

10. THE PRESENT AND PROVEN POSSIBILITIES OF SEISMOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS ARE SUFFICIENT TO DETER A WOULD- BE VIOLATOR OF AN UNDERGROUND TEST BAN, EXCEPT PERHAPS FOR VERY SMALL EXPLOSIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT ONE HAS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PROBLEMS WHICH A POTENTIAL EVADER OF A NUCLEAR TEST BAN WOULD ENCOUNTER. A WOULD- BE VIOLATOR COULD NOT BE SURE WHAT SEISMIC SIGNAL A PLANNED TEST WOULD CAUSE. GREAT VARIETIES IN MB MAGNITUDE WERE REPORTED IN SEVERAL WORKING PAPERS PRESENTED TO THIS COMMITTEE (E. G. CCD/362/ REV.1 AND CCD/399). THE RISK OF BEING CAUGHT IS AGGRAVATED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT, AS A RULE, A REASONABLE TESTING PROGRAMME WOULD REQUIRE A NUMBER OF TESTS. SINCE A TEST BAN VIOLATOR WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THE SMALLEST POSSIBLE RISKS OF BEING CAUGHT, HE WOULD BE FORCED TO PLAN HIS TESTS FAR BELOW THE AVERAGE 90 PCT IDENTIFICATION LEVEL. IN ANY CASE, IN OUR OPINION OBLIGATORY ON- SITE INSPECTIONS DO NOT ENHANCE THE DETERRENCE OF VIOLATION ANY MORE.

11. IN THIS SITUATION WE DO NOT QUITE SEE THE ADVANTAGES
OF A PARTIAL SOLUTION TO THE TEXT BAN PROBLEM, AS PROPOSED
BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF JAPAN. IN 1971
WE FORMULATED SEVERAL DISADVANTAGES OF A THRESHOLD- SOLUTION
AND WE STILL DEEM THEM VALID. HOWEVER, IF THERE IS STILL
SOME DOUBT ABOUT IDENTIFICATION CAPABILITIES NEAR THE DE-
TECTION THRESHOLD, WE ARE READY TO SUPPORT THE JAPANESE
IDEA OF STARTING WITH A THRESHOLD SOLUTION, THE MAIN MERIT
OF THIS PROPOSAL BEING THAT REALLY NO ONE CAN QUESTION THE
IDENTIFICATION OF EVENTS ABOVE, SAY MAGNITUDE 6.0, OR
PROBABLY LESS, BY SEISMOLOGICAL MEANS. WE WILL BE HAPPY
TO DISCUSS THESE PROBLEMS AT THE INFORMAL MEETING IN JULY.
END TEXT. BASSIN

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 28 JUN 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973GENEVA03204
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: n/a
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730632/aaaajtcl.tel
Line Count: 242
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: kellerpr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 OCT 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <16-Oct-2001 by phillir0>; APPROVED <27-Dec-2001 by kellerpr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> srp 980304
Subject: CCD: EXERPTS FROM STATEMENT BY DUTCH FN AFFAIRS SECY ON CTB
TAGS: PARM, NL
To: ACDA
SECSTATE WASHDC INFO AEC GERMANY
DOD
THE HAGUE
USNATO
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

